---
title: "exiouss: Cookie Stealer Bundled in npm Exam Cheat"
description: "exiouss on npm is the latest package from the loltestpad campaign — the same attacker who published the ixpresso-core Windows RAT in April. It bundles a dormant ChatGPT cookie stealer alongside an AI exam cheating tool, targeting students who willingly run it."
url: "https://safedep.io/blog/malicious-exiouss-npm-exam-cheating-tool"
author: "Kunal Singh"
published: "2026-05-01"
---

# exiouss: Cookie Stealer Bundled in npm Exam Cheat

## TL;DR

`exiouss@1.0.4` published to npm on 2026-05-01 from the `loltestpad` account, the same account behind `ixpresso-core` (a full Windows RAT), `godsplan`, and `eyevox` in April before npm removed them within 48 hours. `exiouss` is `godsplan` rebuilt under a new name with the same fake description and the same internal project name. It adds one capability the April packages lacked: `bin/chrome_cookies.ps1`, a complete PowerShell script that decrypts and exfiltrates Chrome, Edge, and Brave session cookies for `openai.com` and `chatgpt.com`. The script is not yet wired into the main flow, but it is present and functional.

**Impact:**

- The package bundles a complete ChatGPT and OpenAI session cookie stealer targeting Chrome, Edge, and Brave via Windows DPAPI and AES-256-GCM decryption
- The attacker targets students who install this to cheat on proctored exams, an audience likely to hold active ChatGPT Plus subscriptions
- The `loltestpad` account published four packages across two campaigns, iterating from a Windows RAT to a cheating tool with a dormant credential stealer

**Indicators of Compromise (IoC):**

| Indicator                    | Value                                                                                  |
| ---------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Package                      | `exiouss@1.0.4`                                                                        |
| npm maintainer               | `loltestpad`                                                                           |
| Maintainer email             | `fucktestpad@opemails.com`                                                             |
| Stealth process              | `SearchApp.exe`                                                                        |
| Persistence path             | `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Diagnostics\`                                        |
| Boot log                     | `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Diagnostics\boot.log`                                |
| Kill switch file             | `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Diagnostics\.kill_watchdog`                          |
| `uia_extract.exe` SHA256     | `e2fda5aa8397799669f29258f69e803cf05d322c1d93269eef6754ca024c3865`                     |
| `uia_extract.exe` VirusTotal | 4/71 — Bkav, CrowdStrike, SecureAge, SentinelOne (all ML-based)                        |
| Groq API keys                | `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` (+ 3 more in `config.json`) |

## The loltestpad Campaign

The `loltestpad` account appeared on 2026-04-14 with a throwaway email on `opemails.com`, a disposable mail service. Within 48 hours, it published three packages:

| Package         | Published  | Real function                     | Cover description                                                 |
| --------------- | ---------- | --------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `ixpresso-core` | 2026-04-14 | Windows RAT (Veltrix)             | "Personal AI System Agent — Control your device via WhatsApp"     |
| `godsplan`      | 2026-04-14 | AI exam cheating tool             | "High-performance DOM utility and diagnostic bridge"              |
| `eyevox`        | 2026-04-15 | Lightweight exam cheating variant | "Professional Stealth AI Assistant with Multi-Snapshot Reasoning" |

npm removed all three within 48 hours. SafeDep's analysis of `ixpresso-core` is [covered separately](https://safedep.io/blog/malicious-ixpresso-core-npm-rat) — it deployed a full Windows RAT with browser credential harvesting, Discord token theft, Telegram session exfiltration, and remote desktop over a Cloudflare tunnel.

`exiouss` appeared on npm on 2026-05-01, 16 days after the April takedown. The cover description matches `godsplan`'s word-for-word: "High-performance DOM utility and diagnostic bridge for modern web applications." `main.js` names the project **Project Phantom-Batch**, identical to the April version. The internal version jumped to v12.0, indicating development continued after the takedown.

```bash
$ curl -s "https://registry.npmjs.org/exiouss" | jq '{maintainers, versions: (.versions | keys)}'
{
  "maintainers": [{ "name": "loltestpad", "email": "fucktestpad@opemails.com" }],
  "versions": ["1.0.4"]
}
```

Six earlier versions (1.0.0 through 1.0.10) appear in the registry `time` object. All six were pulled before this analysis, leaving 1.0.4 active.

Both campaigns follow the same pattern: throwaway account, disposable email, fake developer-tool description, Windows-only payload, npm as distribution infrastructure. The attacker uses npm as a hosting and credibility layer, not as a poisoning vector. "Just `npm install -g exiouss`" reads more legitimate than a Discord download link.

## The Bundled Credential Stealer

`bin/chrome_cookies.ps1` is new to this version. The April packages did not include it.

The script implements Chrome DPAPI + AES-256-GCM cookie decryption. It reads the encrypted master key from each browser's `Local State` file, decrypts it with `ProtectedData.Unprotect`, then iterates cookies for `openai.com`, `chatgpt.com`, `auth.openai.com`, and `auth0.openai.com` across Chrome, Edge, and Brave, covering multiple browser profiles each.

```powershell
# bin/chrome_cookies.ps1
$Domains = @(".openai.com", ".chatgpt.com", "chatgpt.com", "openai.com",
             "chat.openai.com", "auth0.openai.com", "auth.openai.com")
...
$encKeyBytes = $encKeyBytes[5..($encKeyBytes.Length - 1)]
$decryptedKey = [Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Unprotect(
    $encKeyBytes, $null, [Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser
)
```

`main.js` never calls this script. It ships in the tarball for the attacker to run separately, or to wire into a future version. A valid `auth.openai.com` session cookie gives full ChatGPT account access without a password — the attacker can change the email, lock the original owner out, and absorb the subscription.

The victim pool makes this worthwhile. Students running exam cheating tools on Windows have ChatGPT accounts, many with active Plus subscriptions they use for coursework. The exam cheat gets the attacker onto those machines. The cookie stealer monetises that access.

## How Students Get Infected

`exiouss` deploys a persistent Electron overlay when run: a transparent always-on-top window invisible to proctoring screenshot capture via `WDA_EXCLUDEFROMCAPTURE`, hidden from Alt-Tab and the taskbar. The student captures the exam question using Windows UI Automation text extraction or a GDI screenshot, sends it to Groq's LLM API via four hardcoded API keys in `config.json`, and the answer renders in the overlay. The package handles Safe Exam Browser by detecting its isolated secure desktop and spawning a child Electron process onto it via `CreateProcessW`.

![VirusTotal analysis of uia_extract.exe showing 4/71 detections, all ML-based with no specific malware family assigned](https://safedep.io/_next/static/immutable/media/exiouss-uia-extract-virustotal.1nbpwu376kl38.png)

The `uia_extract.exe` binary scores 4/71 on VirusTotal, all ML-based. Windows Defender shows clean. Most exam machines run no AV that catches this. The cheating tool works well enough to spread through student communities, which puts the credential stealer on a growing number of machines without additional distribution cost.

## Conclusion

The `loltestpad` attacker returned 16 days after the April takedown with the same account, the same description, and the same codebase. The addition is `chrome_cookies.ps1`: a ChatGPT session stealer, present and functional, not yet active.

The threat model is social engineering, not a poisoned lockfile. Students install this willingly. The cookie stealer sits dormant until the attacker activates it, either wired into a future version or triggered through the watchdog process that stays resident after the terminal closes.

Treat any system that ran `exiouss` as potentially compromised. Check `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Diagnostics\` for `SearchApp.exe` and `boot.log`. Rotate credentials stored in Chrome, Edge, and Brave. Revoke any OpenAI API keys stored in the browser.

Run [`vet`](https://github.com/safedep/vet) against your lockfiles to flag packages from recently created accounts before install.

---

**Related:**

- [ixpresso-core: Windows RAT Disguised as a WhatsApp Agent](https://safedep.io/blog/malicious-ixpresso-core-npm-rat) — the RAT from the same `loltestpad` campaign
- [forge-jsx npm Package: Purpose-Built Multi-Platform RAT](https://safedep.io/blog/malicious-forge-jsx-npm-rat) — another Electron-based Windows malware pattern
- [Malicious dom-utils-lite npm SSH Backdoor via Supabase](https://safedep.io/blog/malicious-dom-utils-lite-npm-ssh-backdoor) — fake DOM utility, real backdoor